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In 1846,3 an English tobacco dealer was convicted and fined for having
adulterated tobacco in his possession although he had no knowledge
of the impurity of the product. In 1849,4 a Connecticut court reversed
the conviction of a tavern owner for the sale of liquor to a common
drunkard. However, the court explicitly stated that proof that the
defendant knew the purchaser to be a common drunkard would not be
necessary to sustain the conviction.
Some of the early decisions were very harsh in their application of
strict liability to bigamy cases. In 1844,5 a Massachusetts court held
that a reasonable mistake regarding the death of a spouse did not
constitute a valid defense in a bigamy prosecution. An English decision
to the same effect was reversed in 1889,6 the court holding that although
the statute under which the action was brought was silent in regard
to proof of mens rea, such proof was necessary for conviction. It is
doubted that modern courts would take such an extreme position as
that taken by the Massachusetts court, even if authorized to do so by
the general wording of a statute.
The doctrine of strict liability in criminal actions was generally
accepted by the turn of the century, and courts felt free to apply it.7
Strict liability was first evolved in cases involving violations of
statutes pertaining to food and drugs and intoxicating liquor. It was
gradually extended, and soon police offenses entailing small penalties
became recognized as a type of criminal offense requiring no proof
of mens yea.8
Nebraska, although not a leader in the new movement, followed the
pattern laid down by the courts in other jurisdictions. In 1905,9 the
Supreme Court of this state affirmed a conviction for selling milk
containing a poisonous substance, holding that ignorance on the part
of the defendant that the substance was poisonous did not constitute
a valid defense.
One of the most frequently cited Nebraska cases in this field is
Seele v. State.10 It involved the sale of intoxicating liquor to a minor.
In affirming the conviction by the lower court, the court stated:
Regina v. Woodrow, 15 M. & M. 404 (Exch. 1846).
Barnes v. State, 19 Conn. 397 (1849).
Commonwealth v. Mash, 7 Mete. 472 (Mass. 1844).
'The Queen v. Tolson, 23 Q.B.D. 168 (1889).
State v. Sasse, 6 S.D. 212, 60 N.W. 853 (1894); State v. Bruder; 35 Mo. App.
475 (1889); People v. Roby, 52 Mich. 577, 18 N.W. 365 (1884); Redmond v,
State, 36 Ark. 58, 38 Am. Rep. 24 (1880); State v. Coenan, 48 Iowa 567 (1878);
Farmer v. People, 77 Ill. 322 (1875); State v. Cain, 9 W. Va. 559 (1874); Mc-
Cutcheon v. People, 69 Ill. 601, 1 Am. Crim. Rep. 470 (1873); State v. Hartfiel,
24 Wis. 60 (1869); Commonwealth v. Emmons, 98 Mass. 6 (1867).8 Sayre, op cit. supra note 2, at 67.
'Lansing v. State, 73 Neb. 124, 102 N.W. 254 (1905).
20 85 Neb. 109, 122 N.W. 686 1909).
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The statute violated by defendant is a police regulation. It is a part
of the legislation enacted for the purpose of keeping the traffic in in-
toxicating liquors under surveillance and of averting the evils growing
out of sales to minors. The intent with which such sales are made is
no part of the offense defined by law. The statute declares: 'Every person
licensed as herein provided, who shall give or sell any malt, spirituous
and vinous liquors, or any intoxicating drinks to any minor, apprentice,
or servant, under twenty-one years of age, shall forfeit and pay for each
offense the sum of twenty-five dollars.'... Sales made to a minor in
ignorance of his age and without any intention to disobey the law are
not excepted from the operation of the statute. A licensee is not author-
ized to sell intoxicating liquors indiscriminately. The responsibility of
complying with the terms of his license and with the provisions of the
law under which he becomes a saloon-keeper is on him. Under the statute
quoted, he must ascertain at his peril whether the purchaser is a minor.
The current volumes of the Nebraska statutes contain many
crimes to which the legislature has attached strict liability. They
include the violation of laws pertaining to intoxicating liquors,'- food
and drugs,12 roads and traffic,' 3 narcotic drugs,14 and games and
gambling. 15
Whether or not strict liability crimes can be squared with modern
concepts of justice and responsibility is a controversial question. Pro-
fessor Jerrome Hall can find nothing in their support.' 6 However,
it would seem that there is a logical basis for such legislation. Whether
proof of mens rea is required or not, it would hardly be argued that
the offenses characterized as strict liability crimes are not of serious
social concern. Acts such as the sale of adulterated foods, traffic viola-
tions, sale of liquor to minors, and the like, may directly impair the
health and safety of the community. Some efficacious means must be
employed to hold infractions to a minimum. For practical reasons, the
elimination of proof of criminal intent may be the best method by
which to safeguard the public interest.
An analogy may be made to the imposition of strict liability in
civil cases. Under generally accepted tort principles, liability may be
imposed for unintentional and non-negligent conduct where an ultra-
" Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 53-155, 53-157, 53-164, 53-174, 53-175, 53-176, 53-180,
53-180.05, 53-181, 53-182, 53-184, 53-192, 53-193, 53-194, 53-195, 53-196,
53-1,100 (Reissue 1952).
"Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 81-214, 81-215, 81-217.02, 81-217.03, 81-217.10, 81-223,
81-225, 81-228, 81-233, 81-235, 81-240, 81-257, 81-258, 81-259, 81-264, 81-265,
81-267, 81-281, 81-283, 81-285, 81-286, 81-289, 81-291, 81-2,155, 81-2,157 (Re-
issue 1950).
11Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 39-728, 39-732, 39-733, 39-734, 39-735, 39-769, 39-771,
39-772, 39-773, 39-774, 39-775, 39-777, 39-778, 39-780, 39-782, 39-799, 39-7,100,
39-7,101, 39-7,105, 39-7,113, 39-7,114, 39-7,118, 39-7,120, 39-7,123, 39-7,126 (Re-
issue 1952).
"Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 28-452, 28-461, 28-463, 28-470, 28-472.01 (Reissue 1948).
" Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 28-942, 28-943, 28-950 (Reissue 1948).
8 Hall, General Principles of Crimnial Law 279-322 (1947).
NOTES
hazardous activity is involved. 17 To be included within this classifica-
tion of delictual responsibility, the activity must be dangerous and
one which involves a risk that things may go amiss despite prior
precautions. There need be no fault insofar as the actor's immediate
conduct is involved; it is enough that he has created an abnormal one-
sided risk and hence caused a threat to the security of his neighbors.
In effect, he is allowed to conduct such an activity, but upon the condi-
tion that within the limits of the risk created he will indemnify any-
one injured by the hazard.'8 The philosophical justification for such
liability without fault is that the actor should be responsible when he
introduces a new and one-sided threat to the security of his neighbor,
and such contingent liability should insure most careful precautions
and preventive measures.
At least some public welfare offenses involve situations where it is
in the public interest that persons subject to regulation have a special
incentive to insure compliance with the law. Ordinary precaution may
be inadequate. If proof of criminal intent is dispensed with, the liquor
dealer may take effective means to ascertain the age of a customer, the
motorist may more carefully check his car and watch his driving, and
the processor of foods may take added precautions to guard against
deleterious substances.
In addition to this prophylactic basis for public welfare offenses,
it has been argued that the difficulty of proving criminal intent is a
reason for dispensing with the need therefore in certain types of
cases.' 9 It is true that it might be exceedingly difficult if not impossible
to prove that a person deliberately sold liquor to a minor, or violated
traffic laws, but the real point is that the legislature, in certain in-
stances, wished to proscribe not only deliberate conduct but negligent
and even unintentional and non-negligent conduct as well. Moreover,
at least as to some public welfare offenses, any other approach might
entail difficulties in the administration and enforcement of the law.
For example, if traffic violators were permitted to litigate the issue
of mens rea, already overburdened courts might be unable to function
effectively.
Application of strict liability in the field of criminal law requires
the weighing of public necessity or exigency against individual rights.
Cases in which the defendant may be convicted regardless of innocent
intention must form a unique type of misconduct, and legislatures
should be cautious in determining which offenses are to be placed
in this category. Legislative bodies should also exercise prudence in
U Restatement, Torts § 519 (1938).
' Foster and Keeton, Liability Without Fault in Oklahoma, 3 Okla. L. Rev.
1, "8 (1950).
" Comment, 42 Mich. L. Rev. 1103, 1106 (1944).
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prescribing the punishment for the commission of such crimes. It
would seem that such legislation should be subjected to two general
limitations: (1) The offenses classed as strict liability crimes should
be minor in nature, and the concern of a large part of the public.
(2) Since no criminal intent is required for conviction, the punishment
should be light.
The Nebraska legislature has not always followed the latter limi-
tation when prescribing the penalty for the violation of strict liability
crimes. For the violation of certain laws pertaining to intoxicating
liquor,20 the violator may have his liquor license revoked. The loss
of such license forces the violator out of business, possibly causing the
loss of a substantial amount of money when he sells out. In any event,
the person so punished is cut off from his source of livelihood, and
in some instances, such a penalty could work a very severe hardship.
A statute21 enacted by the Nebraska legislature during the 65th
session now makes it possible for the violator of a strict liability crime
pertaining to traffic laws to lose his driver's license. The new law pro-
vides a system by which points are allotted for each violation. The
conviction for any of several strict liability crimes22 causes the con-
victed person to be charged with two points. The accumulation of
twelve points within any two year period gives rise to the revocation
of the driver's license held by the person credited with the points.
It would be improbable that any person would lose his license on the
basis of convictions for the violation of strict liability crimes alone,
since six such convictions would be required within two'years. How-
ever, conviction for the violation of other traffic laws may charge the
person so convicted with up to six points thus requiring only three
convictions for the violation of strict liability crimes at two points
each to give a sum total of twelve points within a two year period.
Loss of a driver's license would be a severe punishment for any per-
son who is required by his employment to drive. Furthermore, such
a revocation has an adverse effect on public opinion regarding our
legal system. A large percentage of the public is concerned with traffic
laws and their judicial treaiment. It is difficult for most people to
justify the loss of a driver's licenses when the act giving rise to such
loss had no element of wrongful intent.
20 Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 53-176, 53-182 (Reissue 1952).
21Neb. Laws c. 39, 88 794, 795, 796 (1953).
2Neb. Rev. Stat. §8 39-728, 39-733, 39-735, 39-769, 39-771, 39-772, 39-773,
39-774, 39-775, 39-777, 39-778, 39-780, 39-782, 39-7,100, 39-7,101, 39-7,118 (Re-
issue 1952).
" Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 39-799 (up to $500 for third conviction within one
year); 53-155 (up to $5,000); 53-157 (up to $500); 53-182 (up to $1,000); 53-
1,100 (up to $500 for -first conviction and up to $1,000 for subsequent convic-
tions) (Reissue 1952). Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-470 (up to $3,000 for first convic-
tion and up to $5,000 for subsequent convictions) (Reissue 1948).

